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National Treatment in Copyright and Related Rights:
How Much Work Does it Do?
Robert Brauneis
The obligation of national treatment makes an appearance in all five of the
major active multilateral treaties concerning copyright and related rights, including
the Berne Convention,1 the Rome Convention,2 the TRIPS Agreement,3 the WIPO
Copyright Treaty (“WCT”),4 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(“WPPT”),5 a group I will collectively call the “five CRR treaties.” The national
treatment principle has been praised in part for its administrative convenience: it
“allows [a treaty] member and its courts to apply their own law – the law they are
familiar with.”6 Yet it is principally lauded for its substantive bite, as a rule requiring
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1
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended on September 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention], Arts. 5(1), 5(3).
2
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome, 26 Oct. 1961) 496 U.N.T.S. 43, entered into force
18 May 1964 (hereinafter Rome Convention], Arts. 2, 4, 5, 6.
3
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Marrakesh,
Morocco, 15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement], Art. 3.
4
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT], Art.
3.
5
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997)
[hereinafter WPPT], Art. 4.
This article will not consider the Universal Copyright Convention in detail, but it
also contains a national treatment obligation. See Universal Copyright Convention,
Sept. 6, 1952, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter UCC],
Art. II. The Geneva Phonograms Convention is the one treaty that might be considered
a major multilateral convention concerning copyright or related rights but that does
not contain a national treatment obligation. See Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms
(Geneva, 29 Oct. 1971) 866 U.N.T.S. 67, entered into force 18 April 1973.
6
Ulrich Loewenheim, The Principle of National Treatment in the International
Conventions Protecting Intellectual Property, in Patents and Technological Progress
in a Globalized World: Liber Amicorum Joseph Straus 593, 593 (Wolrad Prinz zu
Waldeck und Pyrmont, Martin J. Adelman, Robert Brauneis, Josef Drexl & Ralph
Nack, eds. 2009); see 1 Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright

that treaty parties extend protection to non-nationals on the same terms as they do to
their own nationals. It is that bite that commentators have in mind when they suggest
that the “fundamental principle of the [Berne] Convention was national treatment,”7
or that “[t]he national treatment and MFN principles are cornerstones of the WTO
legal system, including TRIPS.”8
Behind that sweeping rhetoric, however, there are reasons to question
whether the national treatment obligations imposed by the five CRR treaties remain
of paramount importance in practice. Together, those treaties now contain far more
specific substantive minimum guarantees than the Berne Convention did in its first
incarnation in 1886. They also contain a variety of specific exceptions and limitations
to national treatment, from the “Rule of the Shorter Term” in the Berne Convention9 to
the limitation of the national treatment obligation in the area of related rights to the
specific rights granted in the applicable treaties.10 At the same time, the choice-of-law
framework in which “national treatment” may have meant more than nondiscrimination has been substantially transformed.11 Thus, to the extent that countries
are compelled by treaty to grant nationals of other parties specific rights to specific
works or productions, and that the laws of those countries do not offer further
protection, the remaining non-discrimination obligation has little room to operate as
an independent constraint.12 Perhaps as a result, statistics about proceedings under
the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure suggest that the national treatment principle
is far more important in the context of internal regulation and taxation of goods under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)13 than it is in the context of
intellectual property under the TRIPS Agreement. While national treatment has
and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (hereinafter “Ricketson
& Ginsburg”) § 6.73 (2d ed. 2005) (national treatment “has clear practical advantages,
as it means that national courts have only to apply their own laws”).
7
Stephen P. Ladas, I The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property 83
(1938); see Gail E. Evans, TRIPs and the Sufficiency of the Free Trade Principles, 2 J,
World Intellectual Prop. 707, 711 (2005) (“The cornerstone of the Great Conventions
of the latter Nineteenth Century was the principle of national treatment”).
8
UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Resource Book on
TRIPS and Development 26 (2005)
9
See infra text accompanying notes 144-145.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 119-125. In addition, non-discrimination
obligations that may apply to copyright and other intellectual property rights have
been incorporated into more general human rights treaties, thus rendering the specific
copyright treaty provisions less important. See, e.g., Dr. Silke von Lewinski, Intellectual
Property,
Nationality,
and
Non-Discrimination,
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_unhchr_ip_pnl_98/wipo_unhchr_ip_pn
l_98_6.pdf.
11
See infra text accompanying notes 146-147.
12
See Evans, supra note 7, at 714-15 (“National treatment, by reference to a body of
substantive law so extensive that it effectively codifies the law, appears to be a
contradiction in nature.”). Of course, unless treaties contain exhaustive rules
concerning remedies and procedures (and the five CRR treaties don’t), national
treatment would still have a role to play.
13
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter “GATT 1947”], Art. III.
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featured in over 200 GATT complaints, it has featured in fewer than 20 TRIPS
complaints.14 Of the only three Dispute Settlement Body decisions finding violations of
national treatment under TRIPS (two of them involving the same law), none involved
copyright or related rights.15
How might we assess the continuing impact of the principle of national
treatment in the fields of copyright and related rights? In practice, the impact of
national treatment may be limited on three different levels. First, the relevant treaties
themselves may limit the scope of operation of national treatment. The treaties may
contain explicit exceptions to national treatment; their structure may limit the
operation of the national treatment rule; and they may contain substantive minimum
requirements that limit the potential impact of national treatment. Second, countries
may or may not offer copyright protection that exceeds minimum requirements
imposed by treaties, and if additional protection is offered, it may be offered by many
countries, thus limiting the divergence of a national treatment rule from that of a rule
material reciprocity. Third, the value of literary and artistic works imported into one
country from another may be relatively small, thus limiting the economic impact of
granting broader protection to those works.
It cannot be within the scope of this article to consider exhaustively all three
potential layers of limitation. Consideration of the second layer would require a
comparison of the copyright laws of all Berne Union members, and consideration of
the third would require empirical data about the value of literary and artistic works
transmitted across the borders of all Union members. This article will, however,
attempt to consider the first layer reasonably thoroughly, and the second and third
layers anecdotally. Part I will consider several aspects of the form of the national
treatment rule in the context of copyright and related rights, and of intellectual
property more generally. Part II will consider the principal issues concerning the
scope of application of the national treatment rule in the five CRR treaties. Part III
will offer some concluding remarks. Among the conclusions will be that although
national treatment continues to play an interstitial role in specific legal areas, its most
important function may be as a symbolic carrier of the spirit of internationalism, a
spirit that may be facing challenges as much from cultural preservationism as from
economic protectionism.
I. The Form of the National Treatment Principle in Treaties
14

For statistics about proceedings under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, see
Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, The Dispute Settlement Dataset (January 1,
1995
–
November
6,
2011),
available
at
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,conte
ntMDK:20804376~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html.
15
For the three decisions finding violations of TRIPS national treatment obligations,
see Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act
of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (January 2, 2002) (adopted Feb. 1, 2002); Panel Report,
European Communities – Protection of trademarks and Geographic Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (Complaint of the United States) [hereinafter
EG CIs – US], WT/DS174/R (March 15, 2005) (adopted April 30, 2005); and Panel
Report, European Communities – Protection of trademarks and Geographic
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (complaint of Australia)
[hereinafter EG CIs – Australia], WT/DS290/R (March 15, 2005) (adopted April 30,
2005).
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Affecting Copyright and Related Rights
This Part will address several aspects of the form of the national treatment
rule in copyright treaties and in intellectual property treaties more generally. These
include the issues of the objects of the national treatment obligation; of whether the
obligation is of a de jure or de facto nature; and of the potential difference between
“equal” and “no less favorable” treatment.
A. National Treatment’s Protected Classes:
Of Persons, Performances, Phonograms, Broadcasts
The national treatment provisions in four of the five CRR treaties address
discrimination against persons, natural or legal, on the basis of their nationality. That
sets them apart from GATT, which addresses discrimination against imported
products.16 The oldest of them, Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, is framed in terms
of discrimination against authors. It provides that, with respect to protected works
outside their country of origin, covered “[a]uthors shall enjoy . . . the rights which
th[e] respective laws [of Berne Union members] do now or may hereafter grant to
their nationals.”17 Article III of TRIPS similarly requires each Member to “accord to the
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its
own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property.” The WCT
simply incorporates the national treatment provisions of the Berne Convention,18
while the WPPT requires its Contracting Parties to “accord to nationals of other
Contracting Parties . . . the treatment it accords to its own nationals.”19
Only the Rome Convention explicitly constructs its national treatment
guarantee by referring to criteria beyond the nationality of protected classes of
persons. In the case of performers, for example, Article 2(1)(a) of the Rome
Convention provides that the level of treatment guaranteed is not just that which
Contracting States accord to performers that are its own nationals, but that which
Contracting States accord to such performers “as regards performances taking place,
broadcast, or first fixed, on its territory.”20 In other words, with respect to nonnationals protected under the Convention, Contracting States cannot discriminate
against performances that took place, were broadcast, or were first fixed in a foreign
country, any more than they can discriminate on the basis of the performer’s
nationality. Similarly, the Rome Convention guarantees to protected non-national
producers of phonograms the level of protection accorded to domestic producers for
the phonograms that they first fixed or published domestically,21 and to protected
non-national broadcasting organizations the level of protection accorded to

16

See GATT 1947, Art. III.
Berne Convention Art. 5(1). Article 5(3) of the Berne Convention closes what would
otherwise be a loophole in the prohibition of discrimination against foreign authors by
requiring national treatment within the country of origin if the author of the work at
issue is not a national of that country. See Berne Convention Art. 5(3).
18
See WIPO Copyright Treaty Art. 3.
19
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty Art. 4.
20
Rome Convention Art. 2(1)(a).
21
Rome Convention Art. 2(1)(b).
17

4

broadcasters with domestically located headquarters for the broadcasts that they
transmitted from domestically located transmitters.22
B. Protection Against De Jure or De Facto Discrimination, and At What Level?
The structure of the national treatment provisions under the five CRR
treaties invites the question whether those provisions protect only against laws that
explicitly treat non-nationals (and in the case of the Rome Convention, specified
activities with foreign locations) unequally – what is sometimes called de jure
discrimination – or also against laws that reach some level of unequal impact on nonnationals – de facto discrimination.
1. Close proxies. Although there is no case law under the Berne or Rome
Conventions or the WIPO Internet Treaties that addresses the form of protection
under their national treatment guarantees, one can imagine that discrimination on the
basis of close proxies of nationality could be prohibited as obvious attempts at
circumvention, even without fully embracing a de facto approach. Thus, for example, a
law offering higher levels of copyright protection to residents than to non-residents
should run afoul of national treatment obligations, even though some non-nationals
may be residents and some nationals non-residents.23 Similarly, discrimination against
a work on the basis of foreign first publication – offering higher protection to works
first published domestically than those first published in the territories of other treaty
members – should also run afoul of national treatment obligations, though nationals
will sometimes first publish abroad and non-nationals domestically.24
2. TRIPS and “Effective Equality of Opportunities.” In the three proceedings in
which the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has found a violation of the TRIPS national
treatment obligation, panel and appellate body reports have adopted a more
thoroughgoing de facto approach to that obligation, based on case law under GATT
1947. In United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, both the Panel and
the Appellate Body decided that the appropriate standard to apply under Article 3.1 of
TRIPS was whether a measure provided “effective equality of opportunities as
between [nationals and non-nationals] in respect of protection of intellectual property

22

Rome Convention Art. 2(1)(c).
Both the Berne Convention and TRIPS recognize and reinforce the close relationship
between residency and nationality. Thus. For example, the Berne Convention
provides that “[a]uthors who are not nationals of one of the countries of the Union but
who have their habitual residence in one of them shall, for the purposes of this
Convention, be assimilated to nationals of that country.” Berne Convention Art. 3(2).
TRIPS provides that the term “nationals” includes, in the case of a separate customs
territory, persons who are domiciled in that territory. See TRIPS Art. 1(3), fn. 1; Panel
Report, Panel Report, EG CIs – US, ¶ ¶7.163 – 7.167194, WT/DS174/R (interpreting
“separate customs territory” to include only subdivisions of countries, and not the
European Community).
24
The Rome Convention explicitly prohibits discrimination against phonograms on
the basis of their foreign publication. See Rome Convention Art. 2(1)(b). That might
lead some to argue that the absence of such an explicit prohibition in the other CRR
treaties means that they must allow such discrimination, but application of such a
canon across different treaties is dubious at best.
23
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rights.”25 That standard was drawn from a decision under the GATT 1947 treaty,
which held that “[t]he words ‘treatment no less favourable’ in paragraph 4 [of Article
III of GATT 1947] call for effective equality of opportunities for imported products in
respect of the application of laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products.”26
The Section 211 proceeding involved a United States federal law that
distinguished on its face between US nationals and nationals of other countries, and
the Reports in that case therefore did not have occasion to consider how the “effective
equality of opportunity” standard might be applied to a measure that did not facially
distinguish on the basis of nationality. Such an occasion was provided in the two
proceedings involving the European Communities Regulation on the protection of
geographical indications (“GIs”).
That Regulation created Community-wide
protection for registered GIs, but imposed additional burdens on registration of GIs
for areas outside of the EC, and as interpreted by the Dispute Settlement Panels,
effectively required reciprocal protection by the non-EC countries where such areas
would be located. The EC argued that such disadvantages did not violate the TRIPS
Art. 3.1 national treatment obligation because they accorded formally identical
treatment to nationals and non-nationals, since they were based on the location of the
area covered by a GI registration rather than the nationality of the applicant. The
Panel appointed in both proceedings rejected that argument, however, and concluded
that the distinctions drawn by the Regulation closely aligned with nationality. That
panel found that “the vast majority of natural and legal persons who produce, process
and/or prepare products according to a GI specification within the territory of a WTO
Member party to this dispute will be nationals of that Member,”27 and that “the GIs
for which nationals of other WTO Members would wish to obtain protection are
overwhelmingly located outside the European Communities.”28
Exactly what degree of disparate impact, or of alignment between nationality
and a challenged law’s classification, must be shown to establish a TRIPS Article 3
violation, is an open question, as is the degree to which a country’s reasons for
adopting a provision independent of favoring nationals should be taken into account.29

25

Panel Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶
8.131, WT/DS176/R (August 6, 2001), see Appellate Body Report, United States –
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 258, WT/DS176/AB/R (January 2,
2002) (adopted Feb. 1, 2002) (agreeing with the Panel Report that a measure “ ‘could
be considered to provide a less favourable treatment to nationals of other Members as
it denies effective equality of opportunities" to non-United States nationals in the
United States ‘”).
26
Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.11, BISD
36S/345 (adopted November 7, 1989).
27
Panel Report, EG CIs – US, ¶ 7.194, WT/DS174/R; Panel Report, EC GIs - Australia,
¶7.230, WT/DS290/R.
28
Panel Report, EG CIs – US, ¶ 7.196, WT/DS174/R; Panel Report, EC GIs - Australia,
¶7.232, WT/DS290/R.
29
Professors Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfus have argued that national
treatment analysis under TRIPS should inquire more directly into the motivation for
adopting particular provisions, because a variety of non-discriminatory motives
should be considered consistent with TRIPS. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C.
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One classification within the realm of copyright and related rights that might require
further exploration of those questions is that of literary works distinguished on the
basis of the language in which they are written. Some public lending right schemes,
for example, offer benefits for works written in or translated into one language,
typically the national language, but not for those written in or translated into other
languages.30 To be sure, in many cases there will be a strong correlation between
language and nationality – for example, most authors writing in or translating into or
from Swedish are probably Swedish nationals.31 The government of Sweden, however,
would argue that it has an interest in making materials available in Swedish that is
independent of the differential benefits that the scheme may end up providing to
Swedish nationals: it would be delighted, no doubt, if many non-Swedish nationals
began to write in Swedish. Moreover, it would be strange if some language-based
schemes survived TRIPS Article 3 scrutiny because many non-nationals wrote in the
national language – France, for example, could point to Belgians, Swiss, Canadians,
Moroccans and others who wrote in French – while other identical schemes were
struck down because fewer non-nationals wrote in the national language.
Once one holds that de facto discrimination is prohibited by a national
treatment guarantee, it appears to be tempting to hold that it is always the impact of
the scrutinized provision that matters, and thus that even explicit “de jure” legal
distinctions on the basis of nationality will not automatically run afoul of national
treatment. Thus, its 2001 decision in Korea – Various Measures on Beef,32 the WTO
Appellate Body held that measures that formally treated nationals and non-nationals
differently did not automatically violate the national treatment obligation in Article
III.4. of GATT:
A formal difference in treatment between imported and like domestic
products is . . . neither necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation of Article
III:4. Whether or not imported products are treated "less favourably" than
like domestic products should be assessed instead by examining whether a
measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the
detriment of imported products.33

Dreyfus, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International
Intellectual Property Regime 100-102 (2012)
30
For comparative documentation of existing public lending right programs, seePLR
International,
Established
PLR
Regimes,
http://www.plrinternational.com/established/established.htm.
31
The Swedish public lending right scheme covers literary works written in Swedish,
translations to or from Swedish and books written in foreign languages by authors
permanently
residing
in
Sweden.
See
http://www.plrinternational.com/established/plradministrators/sweden.htm.
Exactly how the inclusion of all permanent residents in the scheme should affect the
national treatment analysis, and whether that provision could be found severable, are
open questions.
32
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted January 10,
2001).
33
Id. at ¶ 137.
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Two final comments on the national treatment obligation under copyright
treaties. First, the economic and cultural interests that benefit from national
treatment violations under copyright treaties may be different than those benefiting
from national treatment violations involving goods under GATT. Differential
overregulation or overtaxation of imported products will presumably increase their
cost, thus harming domestic consumers and benefiting domestic producers. By
contrast, differential underprotection of foreign authors is likely to reduce the cost of
consuming their works, thus benefiting domestic consumers and harming domestic
authors.34 Analogously, a U.S. International Trade Commission study estimated that
the Uruguay Round Agreements, by lowering barriers to trade in goods, would harm
U.S. textile producers and reduce textile prices for U.S. consumers;35 at the same time,
by strengthening intellectual property protection, they would benefit U.S.
manufacturers of recorded media (encompassing computer software, sound
recordings, and videos) and raise prices for consumers of that media.36 However, some
schemes that arguably violate the national treatment obligation in copyright and
related rights are more likely to harm domestic consumers and benefit domestic
producers. One example that is discussed further below is a tax on all movie tickets
the proceeds of which are distributed solely to domestic movie producers
Second, it is not clear that either GATT or TRIPS national treatment analysis
is equipped to deal with a situation in which an entire broad category of goods or
works of authorship is primarily produced abroad, and the entire category is
regulated, taxed or underprotected with the goal of improving domestic balance of
trade. Suppose, hypothetically, that 95% of perfumes and other fragrances are
produced abroad, and 5% domestically. A tax on all fragrances will then primarily
burden non-nationals, and will likely reduce consumption of foreign goods if
consumer spending is diverted to a range of other goods that are on average more
likely to be produced domestically. Yet if consumers, faced with high perfume prices,
end up buying a wide variety of other goods – some buy flowers for presents instead,
others buy chocolates or leather goods or liquor – it is not clear that any of those
others can be considered “like goods” for purposes of performing GATT national
treatment analysis. Similarly, if perfumes were largely formulated abroad but often
imitated domestically, it is not clear that under current TRIPS Article 3 analysis the
refusal to consider the original formulation “authorship” and the scent a copyrightprotected work would be considered a violation of the obligation to treat nationals of
other WTO members “no less favorably” than a country’s own nationals.
C. Equal Treatment vs. “No Less Favorable” – In Some Respects a False Dichotomy
It may appear that some copyright treaties, such as the Berne Convention,
guarantee foreign authors treatment equal to domestic authors, whereas others, such
as TRIPS, guarantee a different level of treatment, namely treatment “no less favorable
than” domestic authors. However, this different wording is in at least some respects
likely not to result in a difference in practice. Suppose, for example, that a law
34

In both cases, the benefitted parties might be reversed in the long run if the
regulation or refusal to extend protection were part of a strategy to demand reciprocal
treatment from foreign countries.
35
See I United States International Trade Commission, Potential Impact on the U.S.
Economy and Industries of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements, Investigation No.
332-353, at IV-9 (1994).
36
See id. at VII-18 – VII-19.
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restored copyright in works of foreign authors that had fallen into the public domain
for lack of compliance with formalities, but did not restore copyright in such works of
domestic authors.37 Such a law does not treat foreign authors less favorably that
domestic authors, and hence does not violate TRIPS, but it clearly does not treat
foreign and domestic authors equally. However, domestic authors could not claim a
violation of Berne national treatment, because they are not beneficiaries of that
provision, or indeed of the entire Convention. At the same time, foreign authors,
unable to show any injury from having their copyrights restored while those of
domestic authors had not been, should not be able to claim a violation of Berne
national treatment either. Thus, such a case should turn out no differently under
Berne than under TRIPS.
It may be that the TRIPS national treatment provision would be interpreted
to encompass a broader range of de facto disparate impact violations than the Berne
provision. Although TRIPS Article 3 is explicitly limited by the national treatment
exceptions enumerated in the treaties it incorporates,38 it does not seem that it would
be limited by the form of national treatment obligation in an incorporated treaty with
respect to rights covered by that treaty. In other words, the TRIPS Article 3 national
treatment guarantee with respect to intellectual property, including copyright, is
independent of the Berne Convention Article 5 guarantee, and apart from the specific
Berne exceptions it incorporates, follows its own form, which may include greater de
facto analysis than Berne Article 5.39
II. The Scope of the National Treatment Principle in Treaties
Affecting Copyright and Related Rights
This article now turns to the issue of the scope of application of the national
treatment rules discussed in Part I. This Part will consider several of the principal
issues of scope of application, including the works or other productions to which the
rules apply, the rights subject to the rules, remedies, acquisition of rights, term, and
ownership.
A. Subject-matter: Works or Productions
to Which National Treatment Obligations Apply
With respect to the subject matter protected by a national treatment
guarantee, the provisions of the five CRR treaties are partially but not entirely
37

Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (restoring copyright in certain works under somewhat more
complicated terms than those posed hypothetically in the text).
38
See TRIPS Art. 3(1) (providing that the Article 3 national treatment guarantee is
“subject to the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention
(1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.”).
39
Of course, TRIPS also incorporates the Berne Article 5 national treatment
obligation. See TRIPS Art. 9 (incorporating Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto, excepting Article 6bis). Thus, if the
Berne Article 5 obligation were found to prohibit some provisions that the TRIPS
Article 3 obligation did not – say, formally different treatment that did not deny
effective equality of opportunity - those provisions could also amount to a violation of
TRIPS that could theoretically result in the authorization of sanctions. It is not clear
what those sanctions would be, however.
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independent of each other. The Berne Convention defines the subject matter to which
it applies in Article 2(1). TRIPS and the WCT both incorporate that provision, and
both also contain two provisions that at least clarify and arguably expand Berne
Convention subject matter. Neither TRIPS nor the WPPT incorporate the Rome
Convention provisions defining protected subject matter, but they identify subject
matter that is congruent with Rome Convention subject matter.
1. Literary and Artistic Works: Berne and its Incorporation into TRIPS and the WCT. The
Berne Convention identifies its subject matter both by providing a general definition
of a term and by enumerating specific examples that it states are not-exclusive. The
general term is “literary and artistic works,” defined as “including every production in
the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its
expression.”40 That definition is followed by an enumeration of many more specific
examples of covered types of works – from books to cinematographic works and
architecture.41
It is clear that specifically listed or enumerated works must be protected by
Berne Union members, and are subject to obligations regarding the absence of
formalities, substantive minimums, and national treatment. Article 2(6) provides that
“[t]he works mentioned in this Article shall enjoy protection in all countries of the
Union,”42 Article 5(1) requires Union members to grant authors “in respect of works
for which they are protected under this Convention” both national treatment and the
specific minimum protections recognized in the Convention, and Article 5(2) provides
that enjoyment of such rights “shall not be subject to any formality.”
The obligations with regard to unenumerated literary and artistic works are
less clear, as is the nature of the line separating literary and artistic works from other
productions that would not qualify as literary and artistic works. The enumeration of
literary and artistic works in Article 2(1) is structured to be non-exclusive, preceded
as it is by the phrase “such as.”43 Most commentators, however, take Article 2(6)’s
reference to “works mentioned in this Article” to mean specifically enumerated types
rather than the overarching category of “literary and artistic works,”44 and conclude
that the revision history of Berne suggests that Union members are not obligated to
protect any types of works that are not enumerated.45

40

Berne Convention art. 2(1)
See id.
42
Berne Convention Art. 2(6).
43
See Berne Convention Art. 2(1).
44
See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg § 8.09 (“It is of critical importance for a work to be
included in the list in article 2(1) because article 2(6) . . . puts it beyond doubt that
such works are then to be protected under the Convention.”); Silke von Lewinski,
International Copyright Law and Policy § 5.76 (2008) (under Article 2(6), “only the
works explicitly mentioned in Article 2(1), (3) and (5) of the Berne Convention must
be protected by Union countries in the Berne context.”); Wilhelm Nordemann, Kai
Vinck, Paul Hertin & Gerald Meyer, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights
Law: Commentary with Special Emphasis on the European Community Art. 2/2bis BC
n. 2 (1990) (“The list of individual categories of works in Art. 2 par. 1 is not exhaustive.
But the right to protection under convention law is limited to this catalogue.”)
45
See, e.g., 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg §§ 8.08, 8.11.
41
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If a Union member decides to protect a type of production that is not an
enumerated work, two issues arise. First, is that type of production a “literary and
artistic work”? If not, then the production falls completely outside of the scope of the
Convention, and protection for that production need not meet any Convention
requirements. Second, if a Union member extends protection to a production
determined to be an unenumerated literary and artistic work, must its protection of
that work comply with both Berne substantive minimums and the national treatment
obligation, or only the latter?
a. The outer boundaries of “literary and artistic work.” With regard to the first
question, there are two principal schools of thought. Some commentators, such as
Stephen Ladas46 and Sam Ricketson,47 have argued that the Berne Convention leaves it
up to Union members to decide whether a particular type of unenumerated
production is a literary and artistic work. According to those commentators, one
must look to the treatment of the production in the Union member’s own laws. If
those laws treat a production as a literary and artistic work – if they include the
production alongside Berne-enumerated works as copyrightable subject matter – then
with respect to that country, the production is a “literary and artistic work” within
the meaning of Berne. Under that approach, for example, because the United States
treats sound recordings as copyrightable subject matter alongside literary works and
other Berne-enumerated works,48 it must meet at least some Berne Convention
obligations with respect to sound recordings. By contrast, countries such as France
and Germany that do not group sound recordings with enumerated Berne works need
not meet Berne obligations with respect to them.
The other school of thought insists that the Berne Convention itself provides
a determinate answer to the question of whether a particular production counts as a
“literary or artistic work,” and that countries that group productions that are not
Berne Convention literary or artistic works together with those that are do not have
any Berne Convention obligations with respect to the former. Adherents of that
school include Fritz Ostertag,49 Eugen Ulmer,50 and David Vaver.51 Thus, Vaver argues
that “‘[a]uthor’ in the [Berne Convention] implies a person who applies his/her
personal creativity to produce a literary or artistic work.”52 The text of the Berne
Convention does not include such a definition, but with respect to collections of
works (sometimes referred to as compilations), it does require protection to such
collections which “by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents,
46

See Stephen P. Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property
266 (1938).
47
See Sam Ricketson, The Law of Intellectual Property ¶14.22 (1984)
48
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (listing “sound recordings” as a category of works of
authorship in which copyright subsists).
49
See Fritz Ostertag, La Protection des disques étrangers en Suisse, 53 Le Droit
d’Auteur 41 (1940).
50
See Eugen Ulmer, The “Droit de Suite” in International Copyright Law, 6 Int. Rev. of
Intell. Prop. & Comp. L. 12, 21 (1975).
51
See David Vaver, The National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal
Copyright Conventions Part One, 17 Int. Rev. of Intell. Prop. & Comp. L. 577, 590-597
(1986).
52
Id. at 594.
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constitute intellectual creations,”53 and one can argue that that provision makes
explicit with regard to collections a requirement of “intellectual creation” that is
implicit with respect to all literary and artistic works.54
Under that interpretation, some productions that are not enumerated in the
Berne Convention would seem more likely to be found to be Berne Convention
“literary and artistic works,” whereas others would not. Contrast, for example,
perfumes and databases. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has ruled that the
copyright law of the Netherlands protects perfumes.55 The creation of a perfume, as a
particular olfactory experience, would seem to involve an exercise of personal
creativity. There are no hard-and-fast rules for making a good perfume; the process
involves the application of judgment to the creation of a product of aesthetic appeal.
Moreover, the olfactory experiences can apparently be fixed stably enough and
perceived subtly enough to be recognized as “the same” or “different” on different
occasions. People will recognize Chanel No. 5 or Shalimar from bottles made years
apart, an important condition for being recognizable as a “work.” Thus, once a
country recognizes copyright protection for perfumes, it is likely to be subject to
Berne Convention obligations with respect to them.56
53

Berne Convention Art 2(5).
Paul Goldstein, joined by Bernt Hugenholtz in the third edition of his treatise, seems
to take a hybrid position. He argues that some unenumerated productions will
definitely fall within the definition of “literary and artistic works” and therefore be
subject to Berne obligations whether or not a country extends protection to them
under its copyright laws. See Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law
and Practice 73-74 (1st ed. 2001) (hereinafter “International Copyright (1st ed.)”); Paul
Goldstein & Bert Hugenholtz, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice
102-103 (3rd ed. 2013) (hereinafter “Goldstein & Hugenholtz (3rd ed.)”). Other
unenumerated productions will not fall within that definition, but if a country
nonetheless protects them in its copyright law, then they should be subject to the
Berne national treatment obligation (but not to substantive minima). Goldstein
argues that the latter conclusion is supported by considerations both of
“economiz[ing] on line-drawing around rights and subject matter coming within the
national treatment obligation” and of “deference to the legislature’s motives in
choosing to place the copyright label on that which, at lesser international expense, it
could have called by another name.” Paul Goldstein, International Copyright (1st ed.)
74-75; Goldstein & Hugenholtz (3rd ed.) 103-104.
55
See Lancôme/Kecofa, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the
Netherlands], 16 June 2006, NJ 585.
56
In fact, in the Lancôme case, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands was recognizing
protection for a foreign national, Lancôme, which was a company organized under
French law. Because both the Netherlands and France are members of the European
Union, the Netherlands would presumably have to extend protection of perfumes to
French nationals under the non-discrimination principle of Article 18 of the Treaty of
the Functioning of the European Union, regardless of whether the Berne Convention
applied. See European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, Art. 18; Phil Collins v.Imtrat
Handelsgesellschaft GmbH, [1993] ECR I-5145, c 92/92 (October 20, 1993). Application of
a rule of material reciprocity would result in denial of protection to Lancôme, since the
Cour de Cassation in France has refused to recognize copyright protection for
54

12

Both TRIPS and the WCT acknowledge that databases can be Berne
Convention literary or artistic works. Building on the language applied by Article 2(5)
of Berne to collections, TRIPS and the WCT declare that if “by reason of the selection
or arrangement of their contents [databases] constitute intellectual creations,”57 they
must be protected as literary or artistic works. However, if a law protects databases
regardless of any creative judgment involved in their creation, then those objects of
protection are not Berne Convention literary or artistic works. The most prominent
example of the latter type of protection is, of course, Article 7 of the European
Database Directive, which grants protection to databases in which creators can show
“qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining,
verification or presentation of the contents.”58 The creations protected under that
Article – all gatherings of information in which a substantial qualifying investment has
been made – are quite clearly not “literary and artistic works,” since principles of
“intellectual creation,” “authorship,” or “creativity” do not define them. Therefore,
they do not fall within the scope of the Berne Convention, and the Convention does
not require the European Union to grant either substantive minima or national
treatment to them. In fact, of course, the European Union does neither. It provides
protection for a less-then-Berne-minimum of 15 years,59 and it provides protection to
those who are neither nationals nor habitual residents of EU member states only by
specific further agreement, thus contemplating a requirement of material reciprocity.60
To be sure, it will be difficult to determine whether some productions are
Berne literary and artistic works by application of an abstract concept alone. In some
cases, more concrete historical treatment will be relevant. David Vaver expresses the
view that “performers, sound recorders, broadcasters and the like are neither ‘authors’
nor do they create ‘literary and artistic works.’”61 Whether or not that is ultimately
true or not – and I have argued that at least with regard to musical sound recordings
and those who create them it is not62 – it does seem that those who participated in the
diplomatic conferences in which the Berne Convention was drafted and revised
believed it to be true, and that only such an interpretation explains the separate
history of the Rome Convention.
Before TRIPS and the WCT, it was also difficult to figure out whether
computer programs were Berne Convention literary works. The production of
computer programs of any complexity does seem to involve creative judgment, but in
many cases computer programs end up performing a function that has no expressive
or aesthetic component: they may just regulate an industrial process or execute a

perfumes. See Beaute Prestige International v Senteur Mazal, Cour de Cassation (Case 0713952, July 1, 2008) (ruling that perfurmes not protected under French copyright law).
57
TRIPS Art. 10(2); WCT Art. 5.
58
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996
on the legal protection of databases, Art. 7.
59
Id. Art. 10.
60
Id. Art. 11.
61
Id. at 594.
62
See Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright in the Era of Digital Sound
Technology.
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commercial transaction. However, TRIPS and the WCT have resolved that issue, as
they declare that computer programs will be treated as literary works under Berne.63
In the case of one type of production that falls at the borderline of the Berne
concept of “artistic work” – industrial designs – the Convention itself provides specific
directions, and a specific exception to national treatment. Article 2(7) of the
Convention provides that “[w]orks protected in the country of origin solely as designs
and models shall be entitled in another country of the Union only to such special
protection as is granted in that country to designs and models; however, if no such
special protection is granted in that country, such works shall be protected as artistic
works.”64 Thus, if Country A, a Berne Union country, decides to grant only sui generis
protection to industrial designs, and not copyright protection, and Country B, also a
Berne Union country, grants both sui generis and copyright protection for such works,
then under Article 2(7) Country B does not have to grant works originating in
Country A copyright protection, as it would otherwise have to under the principle of
national treatment.
b. Non-Enumerated works under Berne: national treatment alone, or substantive minima as
well? Some commentators, notably Ricketson & Ginsburg65 and Nordemann et al.,66
can be read as contending that protection of literary and artistic works not
enumerated in Berne is subject only to the national treatment requirement, and not to
the requirement of compliance with Berne substantive minima. That would provide a
larger role for national treatment. Yet Silke von Lewinski has argued that protection
of unenumerated literary and artistic works should be subject to the full set of Berne
obligations,67 and indeed Article 5(1) accords national treatment and substantive
minima protections in a single sentence, leaving little room for a textual argument that
only national treatment would apply to unenumerated works.68 Thus, it is unclear

63

See TRIPS Art. 10(1); WCT Art. 4.
Berne Convention Art. 7.
65
See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg § 8.11 (“In the absence of enumeration, if Union country
A decides that a new category of work is a literary or artistic work entitled to
protection under its own law, it is bound to accord the same protection to authors
from other Union countries under the principle of national treatment . . . .”).
66
See Wilhelm Nordemann, Kai Vinck, Paul Hertin & Gerald Meyer, International
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Law: Commentary with Special Emphasis on the
European Community Art. 2/2bis BC n. 2 (1990) (“For a new class of works that is no
enumerated in the catalogue, the Union author can claim protection only on the basis
of national treatment of Union authors, i.e., make a claim if national law already
provides for such protection (Art. 19) . . . .”)
67
See Silke von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy § 5.76, § 5.76 n. 14
(2008).
68
See Berne Convention Art. 5(1). Nordemann et al. seem to suggest that Article 19
would provide a basis for claiming national treatment independent of Article 5, but
this would most likely involve a misreading of Article 19. Article 19 makes it clear that
Berne Union authors are not limited to claiming protection meeting the substantive
minimums of Berne if the principle of national treatment required more, or if national
law happened to extend greater protection to them even when it was not required to
do so under the Convention. However, Article 19 does not itself seem to impose
64
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whether national treatment has additional importance with respect to unenumerated
works to which Berne substantive minimum requirements might not apply.
2. Performances, Phonograms, and Broadcasts: the Rome Convention, TRIPS, and the
WPPT. There has been less controversy over subject-matter coverage of the Rome
Convention, TRIPS and the WPPT with respect to their national treatment
obligations regarding performances, phonograms, and broadcasts, perhaps because
their subject matter is defined more narrowly than “literary and artistic works.” The
Rome Convention defines “performers” as those who “perform literary and artistic
works,”69 and thus its guarantee of national treatment to performers does not extend
to those performers whose performances are spontaneous or would not otherwise
count as performances of literary and artistic works, such as clowns, acrobats,
jugglers, and athletes performing in sporting events.70 The WPPT has a similar
definition, but includes those who “perform literary or artistic works or expressions of
folklore.”71 The latter term sweeps in some performances that are not of fixed works
with identifiable authors, but only a certain class of such performances – many
performances of clowns, jugglers, and so on, involve neither literary and artistic works
nor folklore. Phonograms, as fixations or representations of sounds not accompanied
by images, seems to be a relatively well-defined category.72 While broadcasts are not

additional obligations on Berne Union members. See 1 Ricketson & Ginsburg §§ 6.81,
6.82 (discussing the history of Article 19).
69
Rome Convention Art. 3(a) (defining “performers” as “actors, singers, musicians,
dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise
perform literary or artistic works”); see Rome Convention Art. 4 (granting national
treatment to performers under certain conditions).
70
Article 9 of the Rome Convention provides that “Any Contracting State may, by its
domestic laws and regulations, extend the protection provided for in this Convention
to artists who do not perform literary or artistic works.” It is not clear, however, that
a contracting state that did so would be required to provide national treatment, since
the national treatment obligation of Article 4 only applies to “performers,” not “artists
who do not perform literary and artistic works.”
71
WPPT Art. 2(a) (emphasis added). “Folklore” is not defined in the WPPT; for a
discussion of what might be included by that term, see II Ricketson & Ginsburg §
19.40.
72
The Rome Convention defines “phonogram” as “any exclusively aural fixation of
sounds of a performance or of other sounds.” Rome Convention Art. 3(b). The WPPT
defines “phonogram” as “the fixation of the sounds of a performance or of other
sounds, or of a representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation
incorporated in a cinematographic or other audiovisual work.” WPPT Art. 2(b). The
WPPT definition is possibly slightly broader, but the changes were made principally
to accommodate new technologies, rather than to substantially broaden coverage. The
“representation of sounds” clause was added to account for the possibility that
phonograms can be created directly on recording media, using, for example, digital
sound synthesis, without ever having to create sounds and then fix them through
transduction. The WPPT also allows the possibility of sound to be fixed together
with text (such as metadata in a digital file) or other data without ceasing to be a
phonogram.
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covered by the WPPT, the Rome Convention defines broadcasting as “transmission by
wireless means for public reception,”73 thus excluding cable or Internet transmissions.
B. Rights: Of Protection Above Minimum Guarantees
and Remunerations that May Not Be Rights
1. Rights in Literary and Artistic Works: The Berne Convention and TRIPS. The
obligation of national treatment in the Berne Convention, and in TRIPS as regards
copyright, clearly extends to any rights that domestic law grants authors with respect
to their literary and artistic works, in addition to those rights that are specifically
required as substantive minimums of protection. Thus, for example, although neither
Berne nor TRIPS requires parties to grant a general right of distribution,74 United
States copyright law does grant such a right,75 and Berne and TRIPS then require the
United States to extend that distribution right to non-nationals. Underlining this
obligation, Article 5(1) of Berne explicitly requires national treatment, not only with
respect to rights recognized at the time of accession to the Convention, but rights
created in the future – it grants to protected authors with respect to protected works
“the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their
nationals.”76
The most obvious rights granted by many Union members that would seem
to exceed Berne and TRIPS substantive minimums yet fall within national treatment
are those included in the WCT. They include the “making available” right77 and the
obligations concerning technological measures78 and rights management
information.79 Because these are indeed required by the WCT, national treatment
would step in only with regard to nationals of those countries that are parties to Berne
and/or TRIPS but not the WCT. As of this writing, however, there are still a
significant number of such these. There are 76 countries that are members of Berne
but not of the WCT, including countries such as Canada and India.80 Thus, only
national treatment would require the United States and other Berne and TRIPS
parties that have implemented the WCT domestically to accord to the works of a
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Rome Convention Art. 3(f).
See Berne Convention Art. 14(1)(i) (granting a right of distribution in
cinematographic works).
75
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76
Berne Convention Art. 5(1).
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Canadian author like Robertson Davies81 or an Indian author like Arundhati Roy82 a
“making available” right or a right against circumvention of technological measures. 83
In this regard, it is important to note that Article 20 of the Berne Convention
should not be interpreted to create an exception to the national treatment obligation
imposed in Article 5. Article 20 provides that “[t]he Governments of the countries of
the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so
far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by
the Convention . . . .”84 The WCT itself is such a special agreement, and it does grant
authors more extensive rights than are guaranteed in Berne. Like Berne, the WCT
imposes no obligations on parties with respect to their own nationals. Thus, if each
party to the WCT granted nationals of other parties, but not its own nationals, the
rights that the WCT guaranteed, then the Berne Convention would not require
extension of those rights to nationals of countries that were Berne Union members but
not WCT parties. In practice, however, WCT parties do grant the rights guaranteed
by the WCT to their own nationals. Once they do that, the national treatment
guarantee of Berne steps in, and requires them to extend the same rights to nationals
of all Berne Union members, even if they are not WCT parties. In addition, the most
favored nation obligation of TRIPS Article 4 would require WTO members to extend
any rights granted to the nationals of one other member to those of all other members
even if they did not grant those rights to their own nationals.85
In practice, this set of circumstances would seem to be one of the reasons
why the United States has been pursuing so-called “TRIPS-plus” copyright
protections in free trade agreements, rather than bilateral copyright treaties. Once the
United States has granted additional rights either to its own nationals or to the
nationals of any other WTO member, it cannot use those rights as a bargaining chip in
negotiations requesting reciprocity; it must grant those rights to nationals of all other
WTO members. By contrast, Article XXIV(5) of GATT specifically exempts free trade
agreements meeting certain conditions from both the national treatment and most
favored nation obligations,86 and hence the United States can use the enticement of
lower trade barriers with regard to goods to induce both reciprocal trade barrier
reductions and higher copyright protection.
The areas of controversy over the definition of “rights” for purposes of Berne
Convention national treatment have concerned various laws that provide payments to
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See Jane C. Ginsburg, The (New?) Right of Making Available to the Public, in
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1994.
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authors rather than grant exclusive rights. These include schemes such as private
copying levies, public lending rights, and droit de suite laws. How do we determine
whether such schemes grant rights that are subject to the national treatment
obligation? Paul Goldstein, building on previous work by Elisabeth Steup87 and Peter
F. Burger,88 has suggested that there are three elements that constitute an economic
right subject to Berne national treatment.
First, such a right is “effective against the world at large.”89
distinguishes copyright from mere contractual rights.

This

Second, a Berne right “enables the author to control, or to benefit from, the
use of a literary work.”90 This element deserves more detailed unpacking. The rights
that the Berne Convention grants are rights of authors to particular works. Thus,
rights that authors might have independent of particular works, such as rights to
various subsidies or pensions, would not count as Berne rights that trigger a national
treatment obligation. Moreover, a right “to benefit fro[m] the use of a literary work”
would seem to require that payment is being made at least roughly by users of the
work. Suppose that a government is funding a scheme of subsidies to authors from
general tax revenues, and that it distributes those subsidies in proportion to the
revenues the authors have received from sales of their works. Would the restriction of
those subsidies to authors who are nationals of that country violate the Berne national
treatment obligation? While other WTO treaties do regulate subsidies with regard to
goods in industries such as agriculture91 and manufacturing,92 and embody a
commitment to negotiate limitations on subsidies with regard to services,93 neither
the Berne Convention nor TRIPS purport to regulate general government subsidies to
authors. Thus a subsidy to national authors from general tax revenues should not
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See Elisabeth Steup, The Rule of National Treatment for Foreigners and its
Application to New Benefits for Authors, 25 Bull. Copr. Soc’y 279, 284 (1978). Steup
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count as a violation of the Berne or TRIPS national treatment obligations.94 Yet
neither should Berne rights be restricted to compensation that is derived from “a
particular use by a particular user.”95 After all, even compensation tied to the making
of a copy – the quintessential author’s right of reproduction – is not compensation
derived from a particular use by a particular user, since copies can be used by many for
many different purposes, and resold many times, and the value of the copy on first sale
typically reflects that multiplicity of possible uses and users.
Third, a Berne right “values the use of the work, however roughly,
proportionate to the work’s success or prospective success in the marketplace.”96 This
third element is in some ways a further unpacking of the second element, detailing just
what it means to be a right connected with a work, not just with authorship. Just as
payments approximating an exclusive right must at least in some rough way come
from users of works, they must also be distributed to authors or copyright owners
roughly in proportion to the frequency of use of their works.
Schemes that satisfy all three of these conditions do not just look similar to
Berne exclusive rights; they also have a similar political or public choice profile. A
scheme providing benefits to authors that is funded by general tax revenues must
compete with other objects of legislative desire in the appropriations process. By
contrast, a separate levy on users isolates the scheme from such competition. A levy
on the use of copyrighted works the proceeds of which are used for general cultural
purposes will draw the critical scrutiny of domestic authors, who will view it as
reducing demand and redistributing away from successful works. By contrast, a levy
on the use of all works the proceeds of which are distributed to authors of domestic
works in proportion to their success accomplishes a redistribution from foreign
authors to domestic authors, and will be welcomed by the latter, leaving the interests
of foreign authors to be represented only by diffuse groups of users.
Consider the application of this three-element definition of a Berne right to
four different types of remuneration schemes.
a. Public lending payments. Most public lending subsidies are funded through
general tax revenues, rather than by fees specifically assessed with respect to books
lent. According to the Public Lending Right International Network, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg fund their public lending payments through fees paid by libraries,97
and France funds its payments in part through fees paid by suppliers of books to
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libraries.98 All other governments with existing public lending schemes fund them
from general tax revenues.99 Thus, the fact that only citizens of Israel writing in
Hebrew or Arabic are eligible for payments under the Israeli public lending scheme,100
or that only Hungarian authors and foreign authors under reciprocal agreements are
eligible under the Hungarian scheme,101 should not violate the national treatment
obligations of Berne or TRIPS. Yet the fact that the Luxembourg scheme, funded by
fees assessed to libraries and distributed to authors in accordance with the number of
times their books are lent, is limited to authors who are residents of Luxembourg,102
should raise serious doubts about whether it is violation of Luxembourg’s national
treatment obligation under Berne and TRIPS.103
b. The French motion picture subsidy system. France subsidizes production of
French films with funds collected almost entirely from three special taxes: a tax on
movie theatre tickets, a tax on television broadcasting, and a tax on the sale of
videos.104 All three of the taxes are more in the nature of targeted user fees than general
income or sales taxes. For example, the tax on movie theatre tickets, known as the
“Taxe sur le prix des entreés en salles” or “Taxe Spécielle Additionelle” (TSA), is
imposed at the rate of 10.7% of the price of each movie theatre ticket.105 There is no
question that foreign movies are generating revenues under this system. In 2010, for
example, 47.5% of all movie tickets sold in France were to movies made in the United
States, and 16.7% to movies made in other countries outside of France, while only
35.7% of admissions were to movies made in France.106 The funds generated by these
taxes, however, are used to subsidize only certain films. Movie production companies
98
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that are “established outside Europe” are disqualified altogether from receiving
subsidies, and movies otherwise must amass a certain minimum number of qualifying
points, which are awarded for such characteristics as hiring French actors or workers
and the use of the French language in the film.107 The discrimination is thus in part de
jure (the exclusion of non-European production companies) and part de facto (the use
of qualifying characteristics that closely correlate with French authorship), and would
seem to violate Berne and TRIPS national treatment obligations if they applied.
There is a good argument that the national treatment obligations do apply, at
least as to a portion of the subsidies. About half of the subsidies are awarded as
“soutiens sélectifs,” or discretionary support, while the other half is spent on “aides
automatiques,” automatic aid.108 Since 1989, automatic aid has been granted on the
basis of a percentage of total receipts generated by a qualifying movie, including
receipts from theatrical exhibition, television broadcast, and video sales. That formula
thus tracks market success, satisfying Paul Goldstein’s third element of a Berne
right.109 At least in part, then, the French system pretty clearly magnifies the market
success of French films, while blunting the market success of non-French films,
violating the Berne and TRIPS national treatment obligations.
c. Private copying levies. Many countries have instituted levies on equipment
that can make copies of works of authorship (as well as of productions protected by
related rights), from photocopiers to audio and video equipment, and on blank media
from paper to magnetic tape and optical disks, with the purpose of recouping some of
the value lost to owners of copyright from private copying. These levies are typically
paired with copyright exceptions for private copying, and those exceptions can raise
issues, not only of national treatment, but of the right of reproduction specifically
guaranteed by Berne,110 and of the “three-step tests” for exceptions under both Berne111
and TRIPS.112 Considering just the issue of national treatment, however, the levies
themselves are not general income or sales taxes, but use-related levies that should
satisfy the criterion of being closely enough derived from users of a work. Indeed, in
the European Union, the well-known Padawan case has had the effect of more tightly
focusing levies on equipment that is actually used for private copying.113 Thus, the
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crucial issue would seem to be how the funds so collected are distributed. Some
countries distribute some or all of the funds so generated, not to authors in some
rough proportion to the use of their works, but for local cultural causes more
generally.114 Other countries, however, do distribute private copying levy funds to
authors using some technique of sampling of sales.115 In such cases, a private copying
levy should be subject to Berne and TRIPS national treatment obligations.116 France
has justified its refusal to distribute funds from its levy on audiovisual media to US
film producers on the ground that it has no agreement with the United States
regarding “producers of videograms,” yet as several commentators have argued, the
works in question are audiovisual works, covered by the Berne Convention and TRIPS
and subject to their national treatment obligations.117
d. Droits de Suite. A droit de suite or resale right is a limited exception to first
sale exhaustion of copyright in the original embodiment of a work, such as a painting
or a sculpture. It entitles the artist to a portion of a higher subsequent sale price.
Whether droits de suite would be subject to the general Berne Convention national
treatment obligation is an interesting question, but in 1948 the Brussels revision of the
Convention foreclosed such speculation by adopting a specific provision for droits de
suite. Article 14ter provides for a droit de suite, but makes its application subject to
material reciprocity. Article 14ter(2) states that the droit de suite “may be claimed in a
country of the Union only if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so
permits.”118
2. Rights in Performances, Phonograms, and Broadcasts: the Rome Convention, TRIPS, and
the WPPT. While the national treatment provisions regarding copyright-protected
works in Berne and TRIPS clearly extend beyond the minimum rights granted in those
treaties, the national treatment provisions regarding performances, phonograms, and
broadcasts are arguably more limited.
Article 2(2) of the Rome Convention provides that “[n]ational treatment
shall be subject to the protection specifically guaranteed, and the limitations
specifically provided for, in this Convention.” That could just mean that even if
domestic law provides Rome-mandated national treatment, that law will be further
tested to see if it complies with Rome-mandated specific minimum protections, and
the limitations thereto. The WIPO Guide to the Rome Convention adopts that
interpretation. It states that the import of Article 2(2) is that “[e]ven if a Contracting
State does not grant [the] minima [established in Articles 7, 10 and 13] to its own
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nationals, it must do so to nationals of other Contracting States.”119 Yet others have
argued that Article 2(2) limits the national treatment obligation in the Rome
Convention to those minimum required protections.120 This would not render the
Rome national treatment obligation completely meaningless, for the Rome
Convention minima leave leeway concerning the form of protection, particularly with
respect to performances. Article 7 guarantees performers “the possibility of
preventing” certain acts, such as the unauthorized fixation of their performances, but
that language was specifically adopted so that both criminal remedies and various
forms of civil remedies could satisfy Article 7 requirements.121 Thus, even under a
limited interpretation, the Rome national treatment obligation would guarantee that
if a party granted its nationals civil injunctions and damages for unauthorized
fixations of performances, non-nationals would also be entitled to such remedies.
Regardless of the interpretation of the general national treatment provision in
the Rome Convention, Article 16 of the Convention allows parties to limit their
obligations with respect to the Article 12 right of equitable remuneration for public
performances (broadcasts and communications to the public) of phonograms. One of
the options is to adopt a requirement of reciprocity, protecting foreign producers of
phonograms only to the extent that the countries of which they are nationals protect
the phonograms of the nationals of the country adopting reciprocal treatment.122 Most
of the largest parties to the Rome Convention, including Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, and
Spain, have made declarations adopting a reciprocal scheme,123 thus making
reciprocity, rather than national treatment, the dominant regime for public
performance of phonograms.
If the national treatment limitations in the Rome Convention are ambiguous,
those in TRIPS and the WPPT are not. In the case of related rights, both TRIPS and
the WPPT explicitly limit their national treatment obligations (and in the case of
TRIPS, its most favored nation obligation) to the particular related rights granted in
those respective treaties.124 In the case of TRIPS, at least, this may explained in part
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by the fact that otherwise, the national treatment and most favored nation obligations
could extend to all “related rights,” which would be a problem because there is no
generally recognized definition for this term.125 Yet there is a more pointed history
behind these limitations. The US recording industry, in particular, would have liked a
stronger national treatment obligation with respect to phonograms, because
significant revenues are generated in Europe and elsewhere from both public
performance of sound recordings and private copying levies, and if US sound
recordings were eligible to receive a portion of those revenues, that portion would be
substantial.126
In the end, however, the national treatment obligations were limited so as to
deny US firms access to public performance revenues, and probably to revenues from
private copying levies as well. As for public performances, the national treatment
obligation in TRIPS is subject to Rome Convention exceptions, thus allowing
countries to make Article 16 declarations adopting a regime of reciprocity.127 Similiarly,
the WPPT’s national treatment obligation is truncated when a party declares that it
will not fully implement the right to equitable remuneration for broadcasting and
communication to the public.128 The US had to make such a declaration, because US
law only provides for such a right in the case of digital audio transmissions;129 hence,
other WPPT parties are under no national treatment obligation with respect to public
performances of phonograms not protected by US law.130
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The situation with respect to private copying levies regarding phonograms is
a bit more complicated. If copying is the activity, then the underlying right is the right
of reproduction, a right guaranteed to phonogram producers by Article 14(2) of
TRIPS131 and Article 11 of the WPPT132 Thus one could easily imagine an argument that
to the extent that national law provides remuneration to phonogram producers for
certain types of unauthorized reproduction in lieu of the ability to prevent that
reproduction altogether, the national treatment obligation should apply to that
remuneration.133 The United States, however, tried but failed to get specific
guarantees of national treatment with regard to rights of remuneration in both TRIPS
and the WPPT.134 The drafting history of Article 4 of the WPPT, in particular,
suggests that many countries did not want the obligation of national treatment to
reach private copying levies or rights of remuneration more generally, and that they
thought that the wording of Article 4 as eventually adopted accomplished that
objective.135 Article 4(1) guarantees national treatment “with regard to the exclusive
rights specifically granted in this Treaty, and to the right to equitable remuneration
provided for in Article 15 of this Treaty.”136 The argument is that limiting the
guarantee to “specifically granted exclusive rights” excludes rights of remuneration,
since rights of remuneration are not “exclusive rights”; the only right of remuneration
covered is the explicitly mentioned right to equitable remuneration for broadcasting
and public communication. This argument has been advanced by Jörg Reinbothe and
Silke von Lewinski,137 and accepted by Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg.138
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C. National Treatment and Other Dimensions of Protection:
Remedies, Acquisition, Term and Ownership
Although the issues of works or productions protected and rights granted are
the most central to the scope of a national treatment obligation in copyright and
related rights, those issues do not exhaust the dimensions of protection. How does
national treatment operate with regard to such further issues as remedies, acquisition
of rights, term of protection, and ownership and transfer of rights?
1. The Berne Convention (and the WCT). Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention (also
incorporated by reference in the WCT) refers only to works and rights, and to modern
eyes this language might seem not to address other dimensions of protection. It seems
more likely, however, that the Berne drafters believed that, subject to the explicit
substantive minima and exceptions in the Convention itself, they were accomplishing
what Stephen Ladas called “the complete assimilation of foreigners to nationals,
without condition of reciprocity.”139
As for remedies, that expansive view gains support in Article 5(2), which
refers to “the means of redress afforded the author to protect his rights” as one of the
dimensions left to national law but presumably subject to the national treatment
guarantee.140 One issue that arises in that regard is how to understand the relation
between “the means of redress,” left to national law, and “the enjoyment and exercise
of” the author’s rights, which Article 5(1) prohibits from being “subject to any
formality.”141 US law takes the position that Article 5(1) requires an accommodation in
respect of foreign works to enable the filing of lawsuits alleging infringement in them
without the formality of registration required for United States works.142 However,
US law also takes the position that “the exercise of rights” to be kept free of
formalities does not extend to the remedies of statutory damages and attorney’s fees.
The latter are made available only on condition that the infringed work has been
registered before the infringement; 143 following the national treatment obligation, that
condition is applied equally to nationals and foreigners. If that tracks the correct
interpretation of Articles 5(1) and 5(2), then here the national treatment obligation is
doing work where a substantive minimum – the prohibition on formalities – does not
apply.144
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Acquisition and term are two dimensions separately covered in Berne. As to
the former, the Article 5(2) prohibition on formalities precludes Union members from
imposing conditions such as registration or notice on the acquisition of copyright in a
work, and Article 2(2) allows Union members only to impose a requirement of
fixation as a condition of protection.145 As to the latter, Article 7(8) establishes the socalled “Rule of the Shorter Term,”146 providing a default rule of reciprocity with
respect to term, perhaps the single most important explicit exception to national
treatment in the Convention. This exception to national treatment for term, together
with the 1993 EU Council Directive’s extension of copyright term in Europe to life of
the author plus 70 years, was an important motivation for the US to extend its
copyright term from life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years in 1998.147
Sierd Schaafsma has argued convincingly that, as an historical matter, the
Berne Convention national treatment provision was intended to encompass a choiceof-law rule under which issues of ownership would also be resolved by the law of the
country in which protection was sought.148 Given vast changes in general approaches
to conflicts of laws,149 however, it is hard to know how the original understanding of
the Convention should be implemented in the present day, and it is clear that some
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courts do not feel bound to decide issues of ownership of foreign works as if they had
been produced domestically.150
2. TRIPS. Paradoxically, the TRIPS national treatment provision may be seem
to list more aspects of protection than the Berne Convention, and yet not quite reach
the “complete assimilation” ideal implicitly embodied in the original understanding of
Berne. TRIPS guarantees national treatment with respect to “the protection of
intellectual property,” and “protection” is defined as including “matters affecting the
availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property
rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights
specifically addressed in this Agreement”151 That is a long and broad list, and yet
TRIPS does not include a choice-of-law rule. Thus, it would not seem even arguably
to violate TRIPS national treatment to determine ownership through application of
the law of the country of origin rather that the country of protection.
3. The Rome Convention and the WPPT. Although this article, consistent with
common usage, has been using “national treatment” to describe obligations imposed
by all five CRR treaties, neither the Berne Convention, nor the WCT, nor TRIPS use
the terms “national treatment” or “treatment” in their operative language. That use is
left to the Rome Convention and the WPPT. The Rome Convention obligates parties
to provide “the treatment accorded by the domestic law of the Contracting State in
which protection is claimed”152 to nationals regarding specified activities occurring in
its territory. The WPPT requires each party to “accord to nationals of other
Contracting Parties . . . the treatment it accords to its own nationals” with regard to
covered rights.153 The term “treatment” seems quite expansive, evincing the “complete
assimilation” spirit of the Berne drafters, when not limited by other provisions in these
treaties. While the Rome Convention permits the formality of notice on
phonograms,154 the WPPT prohibits all formalities along the lines of Berne.155 Neither
Rome nor the WPPT contains a “rule of the shorter term”; if parties grant terms of
protection longer than the required minimums to their nationals, they must grants
those terms to the nationals of other parties.
III. Conclusion
How much work does national treatment do in the area of copyright and
related rights? As warned at the beginning, this article has not provided a
comprehensive answer to this question. Rather, it has surveyed major issues of treaty
interpretation in those areas, and it has made some anecdotal observations about
national laws actually in force and the value of exported and imported works and
productions.
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As for the form of the national treatment guarantee, potentially the most
important development is the incorporation of de facto GATT analysis into TRIPS.
However, the practical impact of that analysis in the area of copyright and related
rights may be limited, because it may be difficult to identify “like goods” or “like
works” with respect to an entire category of works of authorship, such as perfumes or
fragrances, that is excluded from copyright protection.
As for works and productions covered, before TRIPS specifically recognized
computer programs as literary works, there might have been room for a category of
works of great value, unenumerated in Berne, to be protected only by national
treatment. At present, however, there does not currently seem to be any category of
works of comparable economic value that is not enumerated in Berne or TRIPS. It is
unlikely that sound recordings would be found to be Berne-protected works in
countries in which they are treated under copyright rather than under a related rights
scheme, but if so, national treatment could have a greater role to play.
As for rights covered, the national treatment obligation with respect to rights
of remuneration continues to be controversial. Perhaps the principal lesson in this area
is that the pressure to deviate from national treatment may be coming, not from
economic protectionism, but from cultural preservationism and nurturing of local
culture. Stephen Siwek estimates that the revenues flowing into the United States
from other countries from the sale of software in 2010 was $98.60 billion, which
dwarves the foreign revenues from motion pictures ($23.89 billion), sound recordings
($6.48 billion), and books and periodicals ($5.05 billion).156 Yet private copying and
public lending levies and France’s motion picture taxes do not touch software; they
are targeted at traditional cultural goods like books, movies, and records, and their
unequal treatment of foreigners seems primarily motivated by promotion of local
culture, and concerns about domination by the United States and the English
language, rather than by worries about the balance of payments.
It is clear that in areas in which national treatment would lead to major
imbalances in the scope of protection, such as copyright term or public performance
for sound recordings, countries have negotiated exceptions to the national treatment
obligation, leaving national treatment to cover rights of less economic consequence.
Although national treatment continues to have substantial interstitial force, the
greatest value of national treatment in copyright and related rights may be, not the
specific economic benefits it provides, but the spirit of internationalism it conveys,
and the gentle nudge it provides to legislatures and judges away from petty
protectionism. In 1977, Elisabeth Steup remarked that “solutions restricted to national
authors will set examples for other national legislatures and initiate a backward
development from international protection to nationalism at a time when the
international exchange in culture is growing and the international protection of
authors is more needed than ever before.”157 Over 35 years later, that statement still
rings true, and the principle of national treatment still best crystallizes that spirit of
internationalism.
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